UPI Intent, QR and Collect: Checkout Differences and Risks
By Laís Peixoto
Growth Marketer, Proteside
Published · 7 min read

UPI intent, UPI QR and UPI collect are three ways to initiate payments on India's payment system. Intent opens a compatible app; QR carries the payment request details; collect sends a request to the payer.
UPI intent, UPI QR and UPI collect are three ways to initiate payments on India's payment system. Intent opens a compatible app; QR carries the payment request details; collect sends a request to the payer. The point of risk at checkout varies: in the first two, the page can display a tampered destination; in collect, approval of illegitimate requests is the core problem. In 2026, collect was discontinued in several merchant scenarios, with exceptions noted by the PSPs.
UPI and VPA in one sentence each
UPI (Unified Payments Interface) is India's instant payment system, operated by NPCI (National Payments Corporation of India). The VPA (virtual payment address, in the format name@bank) identifies the payee without exposing the bank account. In October 2026, UPI processed 25.47 billion transactions, according to NPCI data reported by the Free Press Journal.
Intent and QR share the same foundation. NPCI's linking specification defines a upi://pay link carrying the VPA, the name, the amount and a transaction reference, which is mandatory for merchant payments. What changes is how that link reaches the customer's app.
Flow 1: UPI intent flow
How it works. The customer is on mobile, taps "Pay with UPI" and the checkout opens the payment app straight on the confirmation screen, with the VPA, name and amount prefilled. They check the details and authorise with the method required by the app and the bank, traditionally the UPI PIN. NPCI's specification presents this path as an alternative to the collect request sent over the network. Generally, the intent link is used on mobile, where a compatible UPI app is installed; on desktop, integrations such as Razorpay's usually offer QR as the alternative. Check how your PSP and the device actually behave.
Where the risk lies. The link is generated by the merchant's or PSP's system, but it sits in the button on the page. Malicious code at checkout can swap the VPA and name before the tap, and the app opens with the fraudster's destination. The specification provides for a digitally signed intent mode: if the signature does not match, the app should reject it; if there is no signature, it should warn that the source could not be verified. In practice, this specification is a 2017 draft, and you cannot assume every integration signs.
Flow 2: UPI QR checkout
How it works. This is the path when the customer shops on a computer. The store displays a QR with the same upi://pay link; the customer scans it with their phone and confirms. The specification distinguishes the static QR, where the customer enters the amount, from the dynamic QR, generated per payment request with the amount and reference.
Where the risk lies. A malicious script can replace the image or the data used to generate the QR. The customer scans on another device and may not notice the mismatch; checking the payee, amount and reference in the app is an important defence, but it should not be the only one. The specification also provides for a signed QR, following the same logic as intent. The physical QR scam, with a sticker pasted over the original, is covered in our article on UPI QR code and VPA scams; here, the swap happens on the page.
Flow 3: UPI collect request
How it works. The customer enters their own VPA at checkout. The merchant's PSP sends a collect request over the UPI network, the request appears in the customer's app and they approve it with their PIN. It is the only one of the three where the payee initiates the payment.
Where the risk lies. One possible reading: in collect, the store's page has less influence over the destination, because the request reaches the app through the network, not the browser. The risk shifts to habit: customers learn to approve requests that pop up in their app, and fraudsters imitate them. In January 2022, the Reserve Bank of India (RBI), the country's central bank, was already warning about fake collect requests accompanied by messages asking for the PIN "to receive" money.
What changed in collect
- Between individuals (P2P). According to Business Today, an NPCI circular dated 29 July 2025 required that, from 1 October 2025, banks, PSPs and apps stop processing person-to-person collect requests. Until then, these requests were capped at ₹2,000 per transaction. The same report notes that collect for merchant payments was continuing.
- For purchases (P2M). The documentation of PayU and Razorpay, Indian payment providers, states that, under an NPCI directive, collect for merchant payments was discontinued from 28 February 2026: customers no longer pay by entering a VPA or mobile number, and merchants must use intent or QR. There are exceptions, such as transactions initiated on iOS, stock market payments, mandates already registered and international payments. We could not find the NPCI circular for this second phase in the public domain; the information comes from the PSPs.
How to choose and protect each flow
- Follow the customer's device. Intent on mobile, dynamic QR on desktop, and collect only where your PSP confirms it is still allowed.
- Generate one link or QR per order, with a fixed amount and a unique reference, and reconcile each credit against that reference.
- Ask your PSP about signed intent and signed QR. If there is real, compatible support in the payer's app, the signature can help detect an altered link or QR. Confirm with your PSP the standard, the coverage per app and the behaviour when the signature is missing or invalid.
- Show in text the name the customer will see in the app next to the button or the QR, and ask them to check it before entering the PIN.
- Tell customers that the store does not send collect requests. If you have already moved to intent and QR, say so at checkout: any request that reaches the app in the store's name is not yours.
- Check the checkout in production, comparing the VPA, link and QR displayed with the ones your system issued. The risks are summarised on the UPI payment protection page.
Payment providers serving many merchants should review whether their checkout still offers collect on Android or desktop; for online stores, the first step is knowing which flow the PSP uses on each device.
Comparison: intent, QR and collect in 2026
- Intent: opens a compatible UPI app on mobile. Check the VPA, name, amount and reference. It is the default for mobile integrations.
- QR: the customer scans the code in the UPI app. Check the payee, the amount and the QR contents. It is the common alternative on desktop.
- Collect: the customer receives a request in the app. Check whether the request is legitimate and who will receive the money. It is restricted or discontinued in many scenarios; check your PSP's exceptions.
Threat example: if an attacker replaces the store's VPA (the pa field in the link, for example store@bank) with another one before the customer triggers the intent or scans the QR, the transaction can be routed to the wrong payee. This is an illustrative technical scenario, not a claim that every UPI app accepts tampered links.
Frequently asked questions
Has UPI collect been discontinued?
Partly. Between individuals, it stopped being processed on 1 October 2025, according to the NPCI circular cited by the Indian press. For purchases, PSPs report discontinuation since 28 February 2026, with exceptions such as iOS.
Which UPI flow is safest for an online store?
None is immune. Intent and QR depend on the page displaying the right destination; collect depends on the customer not approving fake requests.
Can the customer tell that the QR or intent was swapped?
Only if they check the payee name in the app before entering the PIN. The amount and the look stay the same.
Wrapping up
The same patterns appear in other countries that pay by QR, as covered in our overview of QR code scams in instant payments across Asia. Proteside checks, in the payer's browser, whether the UPI QR and VPA displayed at checkout are the ones the store issued, blocks the swap before confirmation and records the evidence.


